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QUINCY WRIGHT*

The Middle East Problem
The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 is believed to
provide for a satisfactory solution of the middle East controversy, and it is
difficult to see how there can be a satisfactory settlement except on the
basis of the principles on which that resolution is based. The preamble of
that resolution states three fundamental principles.
First is "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This
principle goes beyond the principle "no fruits of aggression." It says there
shall be no territorial fruits from war, using the latter term in the material
sense of a considerable use of armed force. Its application, therefore, does
not depend on determining who was the "aggressor" in the 1967 hostilities,
a difficult question to answer. There can be no doubt that whether or not
Israel was the aggressor, its occupations of territory were achieved by the
use of armed force.
This principle is well established. It was accepted in the form, "no title
by conquest" as "a principle of American international law by most of the
members of the Pan-American Conference of 1890." It was assumed in
President Wilson's Fourteen Points and generally applied in the peace
settlements of World War I which required plebiscites to justify territorial
transfers. It was assumed by the League of Nations as a necessary implication of the Covenant's guarantee of the territorial integrity of all members,
and was particularly insisted upon by the United States in the Stimson
Doctrine refusing to recognize any Japanese acquisitions by its invasion
and occupation of Manchuria.
Secretary Stimson considered it an implication of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1929 to which the United States, though not a member of the
League was a party. By this instrument nearly all states had renounced war
as an instrument of national policy. The League of Nations accepted the
doctrine as a necessary implication of the Covenant. The United States
insisted on this principle in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 before its entry
into World War 1I,and in the settlements after that war. The allies, it is
true, made some territorial acquisitions as a result of their victory but
sought to justify them by the principle of self-determination of peoples. The
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principle has been considered an implication of the U.N. Charter obligation
to refrain from the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity of
any state (Art. 2, par. 4).
The U.N. resolution of November, 1947, partitioning Palestine and
establishing the state of Israel as demanded by Zionists supported by
hostilities of local guerrillas, is difficult to reconcile with this principle,
especially as the rights of the "peoples" in the mandated territories was
explicitly protected by the mandate and Article 80 of the Charter. This
action, however, must be regarded as an act of international legislation
which the General Assembly deemed necessary to meet the crisis situation
which developed from the local hostilities and British resignation of its
mandate. The resolution was eventually ratified by general recognition and
admission of Israel to the United Nations.
The extension of Israel's occupation beyond the original U.N. grant as a
result of the Arab-Israeli hostilities of 1948-49, and the armistices between
Israel and its Arab neighbors negotiated in 1949 under the U.N. mediator,
were justified as temporary measures to end the hostilities. The principle of
no acquisition of territory by war, should, if strictly applied, require that
cease-fire lines be at the frontiers before hostilities began thus preventing
military occupations as well as acquisitions by force; but the overriding
responsibility of the United Nations to stop hostilities justified the acceptance of the armistices, only however as temporary cease-fire lines soon to
be superseded by permanent boundaries established by peaceful means.
The principle was strictly adhered to in the hostilities of 1956. Britain,
France and Israel were, under pressure of the U.N. General Assembly,
supported by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., induced to withdraw to their
positions before the hostilities.
The circumstances inducing acceptance of the cease-fire lines in 1967
were similar to those in 1949. They were justified as necessary to end the
hostilities, but could not be regarded as conferring any rights to the territory occupied by Israel. It is unfortunate that the position taken in 1956,
requiring Israel immediately to withdraw to its defacto frontiers before the
hostilities, was not adhered to. If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., supported by
France and Great Britain, as they were not in 1956, had insisted in the
Security Council, with support of the General Assembly, upon withdrawal,
it might have been effected. The American pre-occupation with Vietnam
and conflict with the Soviet Union on Vietnam, as well as its vulnerability
to domestic Zionist pressure, were factors preventing the common position
taken by the super-powers in 1956.
In any case, the principle in question clearly required that Israel gain no
political advantage, in respect to the establishment of a boundary with its
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Arab neighbors, by its occupation of Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian territories. Israel would certainly be at an advantage if it negotiated bi-laterally
with each of these neighbors while it occupied portions of their territories.
This review indicates that the principle is not only sanctioned by general
treaties, such as the League Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the
U.N. Charter, but also by customary international law developed by state
practice during the past eighty years. It is also an effectual instrument to
realize the purpose to which governments have committed themselves, and
which may be the price of their survival -"to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war." This purpose is not likely to be realized so long
as war in the material sense or the use of armed force can, in some
circumstances, be a useful instrument of foreign policy. It has always been
recognized that the use of force or other duress in inducing a settlement
renders it unstable.
"Peace treaties" enforced by the victor, have seldom lasted over twenty
years. Since World War It it has been widely recognized that the danger
that international hostilities will escalate into nuclear war and the
ineffectiveness of conventional hostilities in dealing with guerrillas, have
further reduced the usefulness of war or military intervention in the conduct of foreign policy and imperial expansion.
Hostilities of considerable magnitude have occurred over forty times
since World War I1, but most of them were instances of civil strife or
colonial revolt within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, and most of the
remainder were ended by a cease fire arranged by the U.N. or other
international agency without gain to either belligerent, but only after large
scale hostilities in the case of Korea (1950). This was not true of the Soviet
intervention in Hungary (1952) and Czechoslovakia (1948, 1968), the U.S.
intervention in Vietnam (1965). The Chinese invasion of India (1962) and
the Indian occupation of Goa (1961). Only in the last, which involved
minor hostilities, did the intervening state appear to have gained territory
or other political advantage.
Furthermore, the increased utility of propaganda, economic assistance,
trade controls and other non-military instruments in the conduct of foreign
policy have usually made them preferable alternatives to war. If added to
these conditions, limiting the utility of armed force in international relations, the community of nations, led by the United Nations, regularly
employ positive measures to thwart territorial or other political advantages
which a state may hope to realize by the use of armed force, the utility of
such measures may be reduced to near zero. For this practical reason,
apart from the importance of maintaining international law and treaties, it is
of utmost importance that no state should be permitted to gain any territory
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or other advantage at the expense of another state from its use of armed
force.
These observations do not, of course, concern the use of force within the
domestic jurisdiction of states, whether in the form of policing by the
government, or riot or insurrection by dissatisfied factions. Such hostilities
must, under international law, be left to the self-determination of the state
where they occur. They are not international hostilities and, only if they
become so because of foreign intervention or threat of such intervention, is
the U.N. concerned, as it was, for example, in the Congo affair of 1960.
The distinction between matters of international and of domestic jurisdiction is the basic principle of international law, giving meaning to the
concept of state independence and self-determination.
The second principle stated in the preamble to the Council resolutions of
November, 1967 is the "necessity of work for a just and lasting peace in
which every state in the area can live in security." This states the basic
purpose of the United Nations set forth in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter,
and supported by the principles stated in Article 2 of that instrument
requiring members to settle all international disputes by peaceful means, to
refrain from the use or threat of force in international relations, to assist the
U.N. in maintaining these principles, and not to intervene in matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
The danger of the Middle East situation imposes a positive responsibility
upon the U.N., and especially on the Security Council and its permanent
members. The Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Art. 24). In the existing state of
the world and with the Great Power veto in the Security Council this
responsibility can hardly be met unless the super-powers, the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., work in close harmony within the Security Council. To this end
shipments of arms to the middle east states should be discontinued.
The third principle asserts that "all member states, in their acceptance of
the Charter-have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter." The statements in this article are designated
"principles," but paragraph 2 makes it clear that they constitute positive
"obligations" of international law, which the members must "fulfill in good
faith." It is therefore, an obligation of all members "to refrain in their
international relations from the use or threat of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The only permissible uses of force by states in international relations are, therefore, in
"individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken meaInternational Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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sures necessary to maintain international peace and security" (Art. 5 1),
and in giving "the United Nations assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the Charter" (Art. 2, par. 5. See also Arts. 25, 39, 42, 43,
45, 48).
These provisions of the Charter "outlaw war" in the legal sense of a
situation in which the belligerents have an equal right to engage in hostilities and other coercive actions permissible under the law of war, and in
which other states are obliged to observe the law of neutrality requiring
impartiality. Under the Charter this situation can not exist between members of the U.N. or according to Article 2, paragraph 6, between
non-member states. A state of war implied a continuing use or threat of
force by each belligerent upon the other forbidden by the Charter and
equality between the belligerents. In the two circumstances in which the
use of force is permissible-self defense and collective security action-the
belligerents are not equal. The defenders and the states cooperating with
the U.N. enjoy rights denied the aggressor. Other states need not be
neutral but may assist the defender in collective self defense (Art. 51) and
must assist the U.N. in action against an aggressor (Art. 2, par. 5).
The outlawry of war by the Charter means not only that armed force
may not be used as an instrument of foreign policy but that other powers of
belligerents permissible during a state of war such as blockades, property
confiscations, visit and search at sea, etc. are not permissible. The Arab
argument that the armistice of 1949, while forbidding use of armed force
contrary to its terms permitted the utilization of other belligerent powers
such as blockade of the Suez canal from Israel shipping has no basis. The
armistices were made to end de facto but illegal hostilities and to establish
temporary lines of occupation. They did not recognize a state of war.
Neither party enjoyed belligerent powers.
The first and third of these principles must be observed if the just and
lasting peace called for by the second is to be achieved. Article I of the
Security Council Resolution of November 1967 is a balanced application
of these principles to the Middle East situation. Israel must withdraw its
armed forces from the recently occupied territories and the Arab states
must renounce the claim of a "state of war," recognize Israel as a sovereign state, and declare that they will respect the territorial integrity and
political independence of that state within secure and recognized boundaries.
These mutual renunciations must be simultaneous. Israel will not withdraw until assured that the Arab states will respect its rights as a sovereign
state under international law, and the Arab states will not give such
assurance or accept a procedure for establishing permanent boundaries
until Israel has withdrawn its occupation.
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The action called for by Article I of the resolution seems clear. The
Arab States, at least Egypt and Jordan have accepted it. Israel, however,
has attempted to interpret the phrase "from territories occupied in the
recent conflict" as not including all such territories. It has professed to
annex old Jerusalem and has said it will not withdraw from this, and other,
occupied areas such as the Goulan heights in Syrian territory and the Gaza
strip and portions of Sinai in Egyptian territory. The Security Council
might well declare that the resolution means what it says and that Israel
must withdraw from all the territories occupied in the recent hostilities.
This is the requirement of international law and the Charter and is probably essential if the further steps toward a secure peace, those concerning
determination of boundaries, navigation of waterways, just settlement of
the refugees' problem, and suitable guarantees can be proceeded with.
Even if accepted in principle, the first step presents difficulties in arranging
stages of withdrawal, supervision, and timing in relation to Arab renunciation of force and recognition of Israel. On these questions the U.S. and
the Soviet Union have been negotiating since February 1969. In his recent
visit to Moscow Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Siser apparently
failed to reach an agreement.
In view of the Arab acceptance in principle of the Resolution, the major
obstacle to progress seems to be the refusal of Israel to do so and to agree
to withdraw from all occupied territories. This obstacle might be overcome
by providing that the occupied territories, or those deemed critical by
Israel, should not be re-occupied by Arab states after Israel withdrawal but
by the United Nations. This might reduce Israel's reluctance to withdraw
and would resemble the procedure by which the West Irian problem was
dealt with. It should be clear that such U.N. occupation should continue
until the U.N. considers it no longer necessary and may not be terminated
at discretion of the government claiming the territory, as was the U.N.
occupation of the Sinai boundary from 1956 to 1967.
The essential components of a "just and lasting peace" are subjective.
As stated in the Unesco Constitution, "It is in the minds of men that peace
must be constructed." The embittered and suspicious attitudes of Israel
and its Arab neighbors must change, but such changes can only be induced
and manifested by objective acts and utterances. The parties must formally
recognize that each enjoys the rights of a sovereign state under international law and accept procedures first to establish permanent boundaries
and later to solve other disputes. Each must affirm intent to observe its
obligations under the Charter, especially to renounce the use or threat of
force in its international relations. It must be appreciated especially by
Israel that formal declaration or agreements induced by territorial occupation or other duress are not likely to last. A "just and lasting" peace does
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not mean that all disputes and claims have been settled, but only that all
parties are confident that only peaceful methods, such as stated in Article
33 of the Charter, will be used to effect settlement.
It is doubtful whether the problem of boundaries can be settled by
bi-lateral negotiations of the parties. The Arabs will not negotiate until
Israel has withdrawn from all the recently occupied territories and Israel
will not negotiate if areas which it deems essential are restored to the
former Arab occupant. If the occupied areas were controlled by the U.N.
after Israel withdrawal, the prospects of negotiation would be improved.
Furthermore, the raids of Arab guerrillas, in and from occupied areas are
likely to be stimulated rather than ended by vigorous Israel reprisals and
this suggests an Israel interest in genuine peace which would imply an
obligation of the Arab states to end the guerrilla raids.
The problem is one with which the U.N. must deal. Israel is an artificial
creation of the U.N. The U.N. ignored the principle of self-determination
of peoples and the rights of the Arab peoples in Palestine, under the
Mandate and Article 80 of the U.N. Charter, in order to carry out the
policy of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, stated in the
Balfour Declaration of 1917, and generally accepted in the League of
Nations Mandate. Under the disturbed conditions which existed in 1947,
the original concept of a cultural home in Palestine for Jews, Moslems and
Christians seemed unattainable. Consequently partition was accepted by
the U.N., modified by the provision for the internationalization of Jerusalem and surrounding territory, where it was thought the original idea of a
cultural home for the three religious groups under international protection
could be effected.
The justifiability of the original Arab objection to partition can hardly be
questioned, but its acceptance by the U.N., the recognition of Israel by
most states, the willingness of the Arabs at the Lausanne Conference,
prior to the armistices of 1949 to accept Israel within the boundaries
proposed in the original U.N. resolutions of 1947, the admission of Israel
as a member of the U.N., and its continued existence as such for a period
of twenty years, indicates that it must now be considered a sovereign state
under international law.
In view, however, of its origin and the continued hostility of its neighbors, it remains a special responsibility of the United Nations, particularly
to establish its boundaries.
It is suggested that after the mutual renunciation of hostilities and
withdrawal from occupations called for by the Security Council Resolution
of 1967 have been effected, the U.N. should invite the parties to negotiate
boundaries directly or with aid of a mediator. If agreement is not reached
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within a year (either then, or perhaps before the negotiation begins), the
U.N. should negotiate with the parties a forum in which, if negotiation
fails, boundary claims can be debated and decided. This procedure would
be similar to that by which the Mosul dispute between Turkey and Iraq
(then under British Mandate) was settled in 1926. The Lausanne treaty of
1924 provided that if not settled by negotiation within a year the League
Council would give a definitive decision.
It should be understood that Israel has no generally recognized boundaries beyond those provided for in the original U.N. resolution of 1947.
The armistice lines of 1949 and 1967 established merely cease fire lines.
The armistices of 1949 have, however, served as de facto boundaries for
twenty years so have a somewhat different status from those of 1967.
Among the forums which might be considered for settling the boundaries
are the Security Council acting under Article 38, or the General Assembly
acting under Article 14; but in either case the agency should be given by
the parties power, not merely to recommend, but to decide the boundary.
Another possible forum might be the International Court of Justice given
by the parties authority to decide on the boundary ex aeque et bono as
provided in Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Court Statute. It is clear that the
deciding authority should not be limited by existing international law, but
should be free to consider all the factors-political, economic, social and
cultural which the parties might advance.
In such decisions the opinion of the inhabitants of the disputed territory
has often been given much weight. Plebiscites have been arranged to
determine their wishes in accord with the principle of self-determination of
peoples. In view, however, of the movements-forced and voluntary-of
the population of Palestine, the opinion of neither the present population
nor that at any particular moment of history would seem appropriate. If the
inhabitants of Palestine at the time of partition had been allowed to determine, Israel would have received no more, perhaps even less as suggested
by Count Bernadotte's Report shortly before his assassination, than the
original partition proposal. If the present population were to determine,
Israel would probably get most of the territory within the armistice lines of
1949 and perhaps some in the territory occupied in 1967. The fate of the
plebiscite proposed for the Tacna Arica area between Chile and Peru in
1925, when each was shipping in population to assure its victory in the
plebiscite, indicates the problem. This boundary was finally settled by
agreement of the parties. Claims, other than the wishes of the present, or
past population, would have to be considered in determining Israel boundaries as they were in the partition resolution.
Another possible forum would be an ad hoc arbitral tribunal composed
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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of neutral arbitrators. This was suggested as the final procedure, by the
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, originally
signed by twenty-three states under auspices of the League of Nations in
1928, and brought up to date by the United Nations two decades later but
signed by only a few states.
Clearly, the problem of negotiating a forum acceptable to the parties
would be difficult, whether before or after a year of negotiation, and would
require considerable pressure by the U.N. and the Great Powers acting
within it. U.N. occupation of the territory would assist, especially if it
implied responsibility of the U.N. to partition the occupied territory if the
parties failed either to agree on a boundary or on a forum with power to
decide.
The remaining issues, it is believed, can be settled if the major issues of
Israel withdrawal from the recently occupied areas, Arab renunciation of
hostility to Israel, and establishment of permanent boundaries, are effected.
Israel should have free access to the Suez canal. The intent of the
Constantinople Convention was to make all states third party beneficiaries
assuring them the right of navigation in time of peace and war. This
privilege has been enjoyed by the United States and many other
non-parties to the convention. The Egyptian right of defense and responsibility to protect the Canal, recognized by the 9th and 10th Articles of the
Convention were expressly limited by Article 11 which said such measures
"shall not interfere with the free use of the canal." If Egypt actually wishes
a stable peace it should be willing to accept the United Nations resolution
of 1951 supporting Israel's right to navigate the canal as provided for in the
convention, and in any case should be ready to carry out its commitment of
1957 to submit all issues concerning the interpretation and application of
the Constantinople Convention to the International Court of Justice.
The same is true of the issue of access by Israel to the straits of Teran
and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Gulf appears to be a portion of the high-seas
because four states, including Israel, front on it. Under the Corfu straits
decision of the I.C.J. and the Territorial Seas convention of 1958, such
waters are open to innocent passage of the vessels of all states.
The problem of refugees has resisted settlement because of Arab desire
to win sympathy for the human misery involved, and Israel's unwillingness
to admit more hostile Arabs to its territory. United Nations resolutions
have called for settlement or compensation of the refugees by Israel, and if
both parties are genuinely desirous to bury their hatchets Israel should be
prepared to carry out this obligation in the spirit in which Germany has
compensated Israel for Hitler's persecutions of Jews.
The problem of Jerusalem presents difficulties. The original partition
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resolution, and several subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly,
supported the internationalization of Jerusalem and surrounding areas to
assure access to the holy places of the three religious groups. Two General
Assembly resolutions of July 1967 denied Israel's right to annex old
Jerusalem which it had occupied. The division of the city from 1949 to
1967 and the refusal of Jordan to admit Jews was unfortunate. Israel's
large investment in western Jerusalem, which it has occupied since 1949,
makes internationalization of the large area contemplated improbable.
The problem is an aspect of the general boundary question and should
be dealt with in the way suggested. Israel's annexation should not be
accepted, and like the other occupations of 1967, eastern Jerusalem might
be placed under United Nations control until a settlement is reached. Israel
administration of the whole of Jerusalem, with agreements placing the Holy
places under United Nations guarantee with a U.N. supervisory commission in the area, might be considered. Such agreements should prevent in
the future such serious violations of Arab rights in Jerusalem as have
occurred during the Israel occupation.
Whatever the procedures accepted to settle the major problems of
boundaries, the results should be incorporated in a treaty signed by Israel
and its Arab neighbors. The whole should be placed under guarantee of the
U.N., and the permanent members of the Security Council. Separate agreements should probably be made in respect to the Canal, the Gulf, the
Refugees and other issues including the use of Jordan waters, but they
should also be guaranteed by the U.N. It should be recognized that any
complaint of violation of any of these agreements should immediately be
placed before the Security Council, and if it failed to act because of a veto,
the issue should go to the General Assembly as provided in the Uniting for
Peace Resolution of 1950. This procedure proved effective in the hostilities
of 1956.
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